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 Unanimous Consent Agreements:
 Going Along in the Senate
 Keith Krehbiel
 California Institute of Technology
 In recent decades, U.S. senators have made increasing use of complex unanimous consent
 agreements (UCAs) which preclude filibusters by setting a time for a final vote on legislation
 and which often specify permissible amendments and their proposers. Because of the
 numerous dilatory tactics permitted in the absence of a UCA, controversial legislation is
 often doomed unless such an agreement is reached. But in spite of correspondingly strong
 temptations for opponents to object to unanimous consent requests (UCRs), consent is
 prevalent. This paper addresses the puzzle with a decision-theoretic model that yields a
 rather stringent condition for objection to a UCR. Two cases of objection in the Senate are
 analyzed and found to support hypotheses derived from the model. A concluding discussion
 considers UCAs as endogenous institutions that permit Senate leaders to induce behavior
 that appears cooperative but is nonetheless consistent with individual utility maximization.
 If you want to get along, you've got to go along." "Be a workhorse, not
 a showhorse." "Freshmen are to be seen, not heard." Congressional
 scholars are likely to be as familiar with these statements as with Fiorina's
 Keystone or Mayhew's Electoral Connection. But if recent firsthand
 observations are any guide, the good old days may be gone. Former Senate
 Majority Leader Howard Baker claims that "leading the Senate is like
 trying to push a wet noodle." And his successor, Bob Dole, apparently
 concurs: "There's a lot of free spirits in the Senate. About 100 of them."'
 Quips and quotes about the good old days are common in American
 politics, notwithstanding persuasive evidence to the contrary, such as
 Polsby's (1968) accounts of cane-beatings, hunting dogs, fisticuffs and
 * Tom Gilligan and Doug Rivers were very helpful in the early stages of this research,
 as was Walter Oleszek, who brought the cases to my attention. Burdett Loomis propounded
 the title, and an initial version was presented at the 1985 Meeting of the Midwest Political
 Science Association, Chicago, IL. Ross Baker and Richard Fenno were valuable discussants
 there. Subsequently, constructive comments were offered by Barry Weingast, Rod Kiewiet,
 Eric Uslaner, Carolyn Weaver, Jon Bendor, and John Ferejohn.
 'See Ehrenhalt (1984), p. 819.
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 discharged pistols in the early House of Representatives. But regardless
 of whether these are good or bad days in the Senate, some "norms" or
 "folkways" (Asher, 1973; Matthews, 1960) have changed over the years
 (Rohde et al., 1985), and norms probably never were constants of
 legislative behavior (Huitt, 1961). The so-called unwritten rules of the
 chamber are usually obeyed, but sometimes they are bent and occasionally
 they are broken.
 This paper reconsiders norms from a rational-choice perspective in a
 narrowly defined setting. Its empirical motivation is that with increasing
 frequency U.S. senators can unilaterally cripple or kill legislation by
 objecting to a request that it be considered under terms specified by a
 unanimous consent agreement. Yet instances of this seemingly effortless
 obstruction are rare.' Is unanimous consent common because senators are
 habitually cooperative, contrary to the suggestions of Baker and Dole?
 A theory and two cases support an alternative explanation. Senators
 conform to the "norm of consent" because, if leaders have done their work
 properly, conformity is consonant with senators' long-term individual
 goals.
 Part I is an overview of unanimous consent agreements (UCAs) and
 two perspectives on congressional norms. Part II introduces a decision-
 theoretic model of a senator's choice of consent or objection to a
 unanimous consent request (UCR). Part III applies the model to two cases
 from the Senate. Part IV summarizes the study and presents broader
 implications for leadership strategy and prediction of legislative
 outcomes.
 I. UCAS AND THE NORM OF CONSENT
 A unanimous consent request is a proposal to break rules. A unanimous
 consent agreement is a UCR that receives no objections and therefore
 supplants the standing rules of the Senate. UCAs may be simple or
 complex. Simple UCAs are reached perfunctorily and are used, for
 example, to rescind quorum calls, to insert material into the Congressional
 Record, to add senators as co-sponsors of bills, and to allow staff members
 to enter the chamber during debate. Simple UCAs are always reached
 verbally and are usually inconsequential to the passage of legislation.
 The focus of this study is on complex UCAs, which are proposed orally
 but are written and published in the Record, the Senate Calendar, and
 whip notices. Complex UCAs are typically products of careful
 negotiations between senators who have a special interest in the legislation
 2 See Keith (1977) for a uniquely comprehensive historical study of unanimous consent
 agreements (UCAs). See also Oleszek (1984, pp. 161-164), part of which is based on Keith's
 study, and Oleszek (1976) for an impressive catalogue of dilatory tactics that are permitted
 in the absence of a UCA.
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 to which the agreements pertain. They may specify the rules for debate,
 who controls debate, the order of measures to be taken up, germaneness
 restrictions for amendments, and time limitations for almost any
 conceivable motion (such as amendments to amendments, motions to
 table or to recommit, appeals, and points of order). So important are these
 time constraints-including most notably the setting of deadlines for a
 vote on final passage-that complex UCAs are often called "time
 limitation agreements" (Keith, 1977, p. 142).
 The resemblance between complex UCAs in the Senate and special
 orders ("rules") in the House is indisputable. Both are bill-specific,
 endogenously chosen institutional arrangements that serve to limit debate
 and constrain the amendment process on the floor. There is one crucial
 distinction, however. A single senator can kill a unanimous consent
 request, whereas even a sizable minority of representatives is helpless
 against a minimal winning coalition that favors a special rule. Thus the
 puzzle: if indeed the contemporary Senate is "in an era of rampant
 individualism" (Davidson, 1985), then why are lasting objections to
 complex UCRs rare?3 Conversely, why is consent common?
 One possible answer comes from the conventional sociological notion
 of norms. The definition of a norm as "a rule or standard of conduct
 appropriate to a person in a specified situation within a group" (Asher,
 1973) seems to pertain to consent to UCRs in the Senate. Without
 reformulation, however, the concept of a norm cannot satisfactorily
 explain consent to UCRs. First, the explanation would be virtually
 tautologous: senators consent to UCRs because to do so is appropriate
 (i.e., the norm); yet, in reverse, consent is regarded as a norm precisely
 because senators conform to the appropriate standard. Second, norms as
 conventionally defined are not useful for deriving testable hypotheses:
 they define appropriate behavior in a group but are silent on the questions
 of when and why individual deviations occur. While rare, objections to
 UCRs do occur, and the mere existence of norms as standards of conduct
 cannot account for variation.
 A newer, modified perspective on norms focuses on strategies of
 individuals rather than on rules or standards of groups. This strategic
 perspective is not inconsistent with the preceding conventional
 perspective of norms as patterns of behavior. But it departs by explicitly
 entertaining the possibility that such patterns, while typically described
 as attributes of groups, are nevertheless products of individual self-
 interested decisions. Individual long-term goal-oriented behavior then
 takes on the aggregate appearance of a norm in the conventional sense
 of an unwritten rule.
 3Lasting objections are differentiated from common but usually innocuous statements
 of senators "reserving the right to object" while clarifying details of the agreement after
 which the reservation is withdrawn.
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 This modified view is similar to that found in Weingast (1979),
 subsequently generalized in Shepsle and Weingast (1981) and Weingast,
 Shepsle -and Johnsen (1981). Weingast used a "rational choice perspective"
 to study the "norm of universalism" in public works legislation, and he
 presented conditions under which self-interested congressmen prefer a
 cooperative game with universalistic outcomes to a noncooperative game
 that results in minimal winning but unstable coalitions.4 In contrast, the
 model for UCRs is essentially noncooperative, but nevertheless permits
 cooperation to emerge in Axelrod-like fashion. Consistent with Weingast
 et al., the observed behavior has the appearance of a norm-in this case
 the norm of consent. The model also yields concrete and potentially
 testable implications for Senate leaders, who may schedule UCRs to
 encourage cooperation even when individuals' temptations to object are
 severe. Indeed, from the perspective of leaders, an alternative and more
 activist characterization of "going along in the Senate" might be "the
 inducement of cooperation among individualists" (cf. Axelrod, 1981).
 II. A THEORY OF CONSENT
 The theory focuses on an individual senator who must decide whether
 to consent or to object to a UCR. He must select one of two strategies.
 Strategy a represents consent (going along), and strategy /3 represents
 objection (deviation from the norm of consent). The theory captures the
 essential elements of a senator's decision of whether to observe or ignore
 a norm, but obviously it is not intended to reflect the full institutional and
 strategic complexity of the Senate.
 By assumption (formally specified below), the senator is tempted to
 object to a UCR for a pending issue x, because he prefers no change in
 policy (the status quo, denoted i) to the bill that he expects to be passed
 if a UCA is reached (denoted x). On the other hand, he is constrained
 from objecting because there exists some other issue y on which he prefers
 a new bill, y, to the status quo, y. (Note that tildes always refer to the
 status quo on the given issue; hats always represent the senator's
 expectation of the bill's final form.) A senator's objection to the UCR on
 x necessarily deflates his expectation of a new bill passing on issue y.
 Finally, the senator believes that his choice of a or ,B on the UCR for issue
 x can affect the probabilities of the Senate's ultimate selection of policy
 outcomes on both x and y. He behaves rationally in accordance with his
 probability estimates of the effects of his actions.
 4In their case, the resulting "norm of universalism" (a.k.a. "pork barrel legislation") is not
 particularly pleasing normatively. But this is not to deny that the norm, while observable
 primarily in the aggregate, stems from many individual decisions.
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 For the two issues (x and y), the four relevant policy outcomes-(i,y),
 (i,y), (x,y), (x,y)-and their associated subjective probabilities of
 occurrence are illustrated in figures 1 and 2. The senator's estimates of
 the probabilities are defined as:
 p = Pr (i I a) = the probability that no bill passes on
 x if he consents to the UCR,
 -q = Pr(' I a) = the probability that a bill passes on
 y if he consents to the UCR,
 p' = Pr(i I 13) = the probability that no bill passes on
 x if he objects to the UCR,
 q' = Pr(' 8 13) = the probability that a bill passes on
 y if he objects to the UCR.
 Thus, by necessity,
 1 - p = Pr(x' I a) 1 - pi = Pr(x' | l)
 1-q=Pr(y |a) 1 - q' = Pr(y | ),
 each of which has the obvious interpretation. Note that p terms always
 refer to issue x, q terms always refer to issue y, terms without primes
 presume the senator's consent (a), and terms with primes presume his
 objection (,1). By construction, and as illustrated in figure 1, the possible
 outcomes are both mutually exclusive and exhaustive under either
 strategy.
 The labels assigned to payoffs in figure 1 correctly suggest that the
 formal characterization takes on the flavor of a repeated play prisoner's
 dilemma game, even though only one actor's behavior is modeled. Choice
 of the strategy of consent (a) is analogous to cooperation, while objection
 (,1) is a form of defection. Accordingly, the terms describing the outcomes
 in figure 1 are duplications or variations of those in Axelrod (1981, 1984).
 Senators are tempted to object to a UCR because to object kills the bill
 on issue x. Given objection, retaliation may or may not occur during future
 consideration of issue y. If other senators do not retaliate, the gamble pays
 off, a bill is passed on y, and the senator receives the maximum
 TEMPTATION payoff. (Utilities are introduced below.) However, if
 retaliation occurs-such as an objection by another senator to a UCR on
 issue y-the status quo remains in effect on both issues. The senator
 therefore receives the PUNISHMENT payoff: his immediate gain from
 deviation from the norm of consent on issue x results in a subsequent
 penalty on issue y.
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 FIGURE 1
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 FIGURE 2
 SENATOR'S DECISION TREE FOR A UNANIMOUS CONSENT REQUEST ON ISSUE X
 ax: Consent \ 3 Object
 D p\ P \ 1
 q \ -q q/ \'q q / 1 q'
 Outcome: (,y ) ( y x
 Probability: pq p(l -q) (1 -p)q (1 -p) (1 -q) q' 1-q'
 Payoff: 1 u u 0 1 u
 The larger set of outcomes under consent contains variations of reward
 and sucker payoffs. Rewards for consent-outcomes (i,y) and (x,y)
 occur whenever a bill is passed on issue y. If a bill on x does not pass
 in spite of the senator's consent to its UCR (for example, if someone else
 objects), then the consenting senator receives the LUCKY REWARD
 payoff. He is lucky on issue x and his cooperation is subsequently
 rewarded by unanimous consent to consider an ultimately passing bill on
 issue y. But if he is less fortunate on x but nevertheless wins on y, the
 NORMAL REWARD is the payoff from the pair of bills, x and y.
 Of course the senator cannot expect rewards to occur with certainty.
 If he consents to the UCR for x but his consent is not reciprocated, he
 will have been suckered. His payoff is either that of a LUCKY SUCKER
 (if he wins on x but loses on y) or of a DOUBLE SUCKER (if he not
 only is suckered into consent on x but also is double-crossed on y).
 Formally, the assumptions are:
 Al. Minimal temptation. On issue x the senator prefers the status quo,
 i, to the expected bill, x.
 A2. Nontrivial time horizon. There exists a future issue y on which the
 senator prefers - to y.
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 A3. Objection is deadly. p' = 1.
 A4. Objection is probabilistically costly. q' < q.
 A5. Separable, von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions.
 For x = i,x and y = y,y, there exist utility functions u, ul and u2 such
 that u(x,y) = ui(x) + u2(y).
 Assumption 1 is self-explanatory. Assumption 2 loosely resembles
 Axelrod's "shadow of the future" since the senator is interested in passing
 some bill after issue x is considered.5 Assumption 3 embodies the power
 of objection and reinforces the temptation to object, while assumption
 4 captures possible future costs of present objection. Assumption 5
 provides for normalized payoffs, represented as utilities. In particular,
 assumptions 1, 2 and 5 permit assignment of payoffs as follows:
 u(i,y) = 1, u(O,S) = 0,
 u(i,y) = ii, and u(x,y) = fi, where
 0<d, u <1.
 Additionally, assumption 5 implies an expected utility representation of
 the decision. Given strategies a (consent) and ,B (objection), a senator
 chooses consent if and only if
 Eu(a) > Eu(1l)
 and, conversely, chooses objection if and only if
 Eu(,8) > Eu(a),
 where
 Eu(a)= pqu(i,y) + p(l - q)u(i,y) + (1 - p)qu(x,y) +
 (1 - p)(l - q)u(k,y), (1)
 and
 Eu(,B) = p'q'u(i,y) + p'(l - q')u(i,y7) + (1 - p')q'u(x,y)
 + (1 - p')(l - q')u(x,y). (2)
 Thus a senator's decision about whether to consent or to object to a UCR
 for issue x is determined by the relative values of his expected utility terms,
 given in equations (1) and (2).
 As figure 2 illustrates, equations (1) and (2) are unnecessarily general
 in light of other assumptions. Normalization ensures that u(x,y) = 0, and
 deadly objection (A3) precludes the possibility of outcomes (x,y) and (x,y)
 5 Al and A2 could be omitted in a more general treatment, but the results would be
 relatively uninteresting. Alternatively, it is possible to incorporate a discount parameter that
 would capture the magnitude of importance of issues over time. For present purposes,
 however, it suffices to employ the relatively parsimonious model.
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.153 on Fri, 15 Sep 2017 22:41:14 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 UNANIMOUS CONSENT AGREEMENTS 549
 whenever a member objects to the UCA for issue x. Consequently, the
 decision tree (figure 2) contains only six terminal nodes, and equations
 (1) and (2) can be simplified as:
 Eu(a) = pq + p(l - q)u + (1 - p)qu (1')
 Eu(3) = q' + (1- q')u. (2')
 Subtraction of (1') from (2') produces the senator's decision rule:
 13 -** q' - pq + [(1 - q') - p(l - q)]u - (1 - p)qu > 0. (3)
 The inequality states the necessary and sufficient conditions for objection
 (13) to a UCR on issue x and is the basis for the more concise and
 interpretable result that follows.
 Proposition. A senator will object to a unanimous consent request
 on issue x if and only if
 u i-p
 Proof. See Appendix.
 There are several ways to interpret the result. Most generally, the
 expression says that objection occurs if and only if for some senator the
 ratio of no bills (ui) to two bills (fi) exceeds the ratio of the net probability
 loss from objection (q - q') to the probability of short-term luck (1 - p).
 A few special cases clarify individual parts of the expression. First,
 suppose that senators are sure of the consequences of their acts.
 Specifically, they know that p = 0 (consent is tantamount to surrender on
 x), q = 1 (consent ensures victory on y), p' = 1 (objection kills x), and q'
 = 0 (objection on x always invokes punishment on y). Substituting these
 values into (3') immediately produces u/u > 1 as a condition for objection
 (13). This further implies that 1 A iX - ui > 0. Separability (A5) permits
 expansion of this simplified condition to 1 -4 u(i) + u(x) - u(y) + u(y)
 > 0. Reordering produces the intuitive result that objection occurs if and
 only if
 u(x) - u(x') > u(y) - u(y),
 i.e., whenever the net benefit from killing the bill on x exceeds the net
 benefit from passing the bill on y. This rather obvious condition for an
 extraordinarily tidy world introduces an important theme that recurs in
 less restrictive situations: rational senators weigh short- and long-term
 factors when making an immediate decision. In this case, a senator
 deviates from the norm of consent only if the costs of certain loss in the
 future are exceeded by the benefits of certain victory in the present.
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 A second, less restrictive interpretation imposes only one element of
 certainty, namely certain punishment (q' = 0). Now (3') simplifies to
 u> q
 u i-p
 The imposition of the expectation of certain punishment can be
 interpreted as an assumption on the part of the senator that there is always
 at least one other senator who will play tit for tat.6 Then a rational senator
 systematically compares his relative evaluations of outcomes (i,y) and
 (x,y) with his relative estimates of the probabilities that bills - and y pass
 if he consents. Suppose one of the two ratios equals one. If, for example,
 the senator contemplates consent and estimates that the corresponding
 probabilities that x and - will be passed are equal (q = 1 - p), then he
 objects to the UCR for x if and only if i > u', which means that he prefers
 no bills to the bundle of bills. Similarly, if he is indifferent between both
 bills and no bills (i = u), then the only circumstances under which he
 objects to the UCR on x is when he regards - as less likely to be passed
 than x, i.e., when q < 1 - p. In sum, two forces can instigate deviations
 from the norm of consent in a world of sure punishment: a strong
 preference for the status quo over a package of bills, and/or pessimism
 about the prospects of passage of the second bill in spite of consent to
 consider the first.
 While each of the above interpretations imposes special restrictions, the
 centrality of long-term and short-term costs and benefits in the decision
 calculus extends to the most general case. This is illustrated by two
 additional interpretations that impose no special restrictions. Reordering
 (3') as
 (q - q') > ( - p))
 allows situations to be represented on a unit square on which the horizontal
 axis (1 - p) is the senator's expectation of loss on issue x under consent,
 and the vertical axis (q - q') is the net probability loss on issue y from
 objection. As figure 3 illustrates, (3") defines a line that passes through
 the origin and has slope /fi. Thus for any given ratio of i to u- (the slope
 in 3"), the corresponding line is a set of points of minimal consent. Any
 such line partitions the square into regions of consent and objection. Thus
 the strategy of a senator with any given values of i and u- is determined
 6Note, however, that this is not necessarily a reasonable assumption. If the other senator
 is employing the same decision rule, the first senator's y at time t is the second senator's
 x at t + 1, moreover, an x which he may not be willing to kill at the expense of retaliation
 at t + 2. To minimize such complexities, attention is restricted to the individual decision-
 theoretic model, even though an n-person game-theoretic model may be preferable.
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 by his probability assessments (1 - p) and (q - q'). He objects only if the
 pair of values represents a point below the minimal consent line.
 FIGURE 3
 INTERPRETATION OF THE CONDITION FOR OBJECTION
 Consent region (0)A
 q - q': ~~~q-q'.> (u/u) ( 1 P)/
 Probability loss on u u
 issue y from objection
 / _ lsli ~~Objection region (0)
 / _ | ~~~~~~for different relative




 1 - p: Expectation of losing on issue x given consent
 'Lines represent points at which consent is most weakly preferred
to objection, because for t e give  values of i and fi, and Eu(,s)
 - Eu(a) = 0.
 The geometric interpretation can be used to illustrate several
 comparative statics results that are derived below. The most visually
 intuitive of these is the ceteris paribus effect of a change in the slope of
 the line, which would be induced by a change in ii or iu (or both). Because
 a decrease in the slope of the consent line necessarily shrinks the area of
 objection, a senator's increasing assessment of two bills (x and y) and/
 or decreasing assessment of no bills (i and y) can change his strategy in
 at most one way: from objection to consent. Actual instances of such
 changes are presented in part III. But first, general and testable hypotheses
 are derived with comparative statics on the condition in the proposition.
 Let E be the senator's net expected utility from objection, Eu(f8) - Eu(a).
 Reordering equation (3') and setting it equal to E yields
 E=q'u-qiu+ui-piu. (4)
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 Stated generally, the question of interest is: how does a change in any given
 parameter (i, iu, p, q or q') affect a senator's net expected utility (E)?
 Total differentiation of (4) provides the answers.
 dE =dE du+ dE du + dE dp + dEdq + dE dq
 du du dp dq dq'
 = (1-p)du + (q'-q) du^ - iidp - iudq + uidq' (5)
 The five partial derivatives in (5) have natural interpretations. Each states
 the precise effect on E of a change in a given parameter, holding all other
 parameters constant. Incorporating the range of values and the substantive
 meaning of the parameters enables derivation of five corresponding
 hypotheses. (The hypotheses are stated in terms of changes in the senator's
 net expected utility from objection, but the obvious converses hold.)
 Ceteris paribus:
 Hi. An increase in a senator's evaluation of the no bills outcome will
 increase his net expected utility from objection, because
 dE/du = (1 - p) > 0.
 H2. An increase in a senator's evaluation of the two bills outcome will
 decrease his net expected utility from objection, because (by A4)
 dE/du = (q' - q) < 0.
 H3. An increase in a senator's estimate that no bill will pass on x if he
 consents will decrease his net expected utility from objection,
 because
 dE/dp - < 0.
 H4. An increase in a senator's estimate that a bill will pass on y if he
 consents will decrease his net expected utility from objection,
 because
 dE/dq -u < O.
 H5. An increase in a senator's estimate that a bill will pass on y if he
 objects will increase his net expected utility from objection,
 because
 dE/dq' = u > 0.
 While most if not all of the hypotheses are consistent with informal
 intuitions about senators' behavior, they convey more information than
 mere common sense or geometric representations yield. The following
 cases were selected to determine whether this information is useful.
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 III. Two CASES
 There are two related obstacles to a direct and large N test of the theory.
 The first and obvious limitation is the inability to measure u, u, p, q, and
 q'. The second and more subtle limitation concerns what can be observed.
 Negotiations of UCAs occur primarily off the Senate floor. Leaders seek
 out and try to accommodate senators with a strong interest in the
 legislation to be considered under the terms of the agreement. During the
 floor stage, one of two things typically happens. In most cases, unanimous
 consent is obtained (hence the "norm"); in a few cases a senator objects
 and the request is withdrawn. Unfortunately, neither pure type of
 observation permits a test of the theory because of the inability to take
 the relevant measurements. However, there is a useful third class of
 observations, namely, cases on the Senate floor in which objections to
 UCRs are followed by public negotiations that eventually result in
 consent. Although the measurement problem remains, it is nevertheless
 possible to use the public record to determine at least how the
 unmeasurable terms changed during negotiations. By focusing on
 observable changes in parameters whose values cannot be known
 absolutely, the correspondence between the observations and the
 theoretically derived hypotheses can be assessed.
 Empirical analysis of two cases serves three purposes. First, descriptions
 of the cases provide a richer view of how complex unanimous consent
 agreements are reached on the floor of the contemporary Senate. Second,
 the attempt to interpret senatorial behavior permits an assessment of
 whether the formal terms of the theory have empirical referents. Finally,
 the joint focus on theory and observation provides a minimal opportunity
 to reject the theory or, barring rejections, to discover important omissions
 that might be incorporated into extensions.
 Case 1: Dairy and Tobacco Adjustment Act of 1983. On October 5,1983,
 Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker interrupted a pending motion
 regarding authorizations for the Department of State to introduce a
 unanimous consent request for S. 1529. The purpose of the act was to
 create a paid diversion plan to induce dairy farmers to produce less milk,
 and make adjustments in the acreage allotment and marketing quota
 systems in federal tobacco programs.7 It immediately became clear that
 the proposed UCR was ambiguous about the amendments to be
 permitted. Senator Melcher (D-MT) reserved the right to object to the
 request, and his key concern coincided with that of several senators from
 agriculture-intensive states. Melcher asked whether amendments
 pertaining to target prices for commodities such as wheat, corn, cotton
 7 See Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, October 8, 1983, p. 2076.
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 or rice would be permitted during debate of the dairy and tobacco act.
 Baker's response was frank.8 "Yes, Mr. President. The bill will be open
 to amendment in general, as it is under the rules of the Senate. I know
 that, in addition to the dairy-tobacco bill, there is a serious controversy
 that revolves around the target price issue, which I believe is the subject
 of another bill. Target prices, of course, could be offered to this bill as
 an amendment unless we provided by unanimous consent that that would
 not be the case." This evoked an outright objection from Senator Exon
 (D-NB), on which Melcher subsequently elaborated: "I am not at all happy
 with the situation . .. that an amendment dealing with the target prices
 on wheat or other commodities would be offered." Baker attempted to
 accommodate Melcher, inquiring how "the Senator [would] react if a
 unanimous consent agreement were entered into that would forbid a
 target price amendment to this bill?" Exon responded favorably. "I
 would withdraw my objection to taking up the bill if we could get a
 unanimous consent agreement that it would be on tobacco and dairy only
 and if there were a prior agreement on the matter of target prices that
 would not come up as an amendment thereto."
 Although the preferred agreement seemed to be one resembling a
 closed rule, Senator Dole (R-KS) then entered the chamber. Baker
 correctly anticipated that Dole would have something to say on the matter
 of target prices for wheat. Consistent with Melcher, Exon and Zorinsky,
 Dole wanted to ban all amendments on target prices. However, he "would
 not consent that we cannot offer amendments to the tobacco and dairy
 bill." In other words, he wanted a guarantee of strict germaneness:
 amendments should be permitted, but only if they pertain to the
 immediate content of the bill, namely dairy and tobacco farming.
 Complications and intensity increased when objecting or objection-
 threatening senators drew attention to the possibility that a trade had been
 arranged between Agriculture Secretary Block and senators from dairy
 and tobacco states. Zorinsky (D-NB) claimed that the chairman of the
 Agriculture Committee, Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), and its members
 had met with Block, "who attempted to initiate a quid pro quo in agreeing
 to what he called a very bad dairy bill, if, in effect, we would deliver
 to him sufficient votes to offset the money there, to take it out of the hide
 of the wheat people in putting a target price freeze on wheat."9
 8 All excerpts are from the October 5, 1983, Congressional Record, pp. S 13608-17.
 He went on, however, to "compliment the dairy people, because their answer ... to
 the Secretary of Agriculture was in the negative, [and] that they want no part of the type
 of involvement in the subterfuge that takes place on a daily basis ... in the Senate Chamber.
 Once again, it substantiates the fact that . . there are two things people do not want to see
 done ... watching sausage made and watching a legislature pass laws."
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 Charges and countercharges occupy several pages in the Record, but
 a description of the outcome and interpretation of how senators' likely
 preferences and subjective probabilities encouraged objection is more
 important for present purposes than is a continued summary of the debate.
 The winners of the immediate dispute were the senators who objected
 to the original UCR. The renegotiated agreement stated that "no
 amendments relative to target prices or loan rates relating to commodities
 other than dairy or tobacco shall be in order" (p. 13617), which is precisely
 the narrowly applied germaneness rule that Dole requested.
 The situation is depicted formally in figure 4, which helps account for
 the objections to the original UCR. The original bill pertained to dairy
 and tobacco policy, which for purposes of exposition is collapsed onto
 one dimension, xi. The second dimension, X2, represents target prices for
 other commodities (wheat, cotton, rice and corn). From a narrow
 perspective, the Agriculture Committee's bill was an attempt to change
 policy only in a pro-dairy and tobacco direction, from ix to xl on the
 horizontal axis. However, senators from states affected by target prices
 were not particularly interested in dairy and tobacco and consequently
 had a broader perspective. Familiar with the rules of the Senate in which
 germaneness is conceived more broadly than in the House, these senators
 behaved as if the status quo were the two-dimensional point, i, which
 provided for moderately high target prices and moderate support for
 dairy and tobacco farmers. The key point is that the expected outcome
 under the original UCR consisted of a change in two directions-more
 favorable programs for dairy and tobacco farmers (about which they
 cared little) and reductions in target prices (about which they cared a great
 deal). Therefore, as represented by the elliptical indifference curves, the
 policy change in the two-dimensional space from i to x was highly
 undesirable under the initial unanimous consent request.'"
 What, then, did the objectors gain in the second UCR, and how well
 does it conform to the theory? The "proposal germaneness" (Shepsle,
 1979) provision they sought and attained has a simple spatial
 interpretation: it confines the set of permissible amendments to the xi
 dimension represented by the dotted line passing through i. When
 objecting senators were assured that policy on the target price dimension,
 x2, would remain fixed at i2 during consideration of S.1529, their expected
 outcome too could change only in the horizontal direction. Therefore, x*
 in figure 4 represents their expectation under the second unanimous
 consent request.
 10 The precise locations of the points in figure 3 are not central to the argument, provided
 that the indifference curves of objectors are elliptical in the manner shown.
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 FIGURE 4
 OBJECTOR'S PREFERENCES AND PERCEPTIONS OF UCRs
 FOR THE DAIRY AND TOBACCO ADJUSTMENT ACT
 xpected change /
 x : Targt Price under second UCR// x2: Ta et Pricess
 for wheat, etc.
 Expected change\ _ /





 xl: Support for Dairy and Tabacco Farmers
 The geometric representation of the location of x* on a much higher
 utility contour than x has a precise analogue in the theory, namely a
 positive change in x, which, holding y constant, can be treated as a positive
 change in u. Hypothesis 2 states that dE/duf = (q' - q) < 0, meaning that,
 holding other parameters constant, a positive change in the value of the
 projected outcome makes objection less attractive. Although there
 obviously is no precise gauge for the initial or terminal states of the relevant
 senators' calculations, the theory and the situation can be inspected more
 closely to estimate how responsive the initial objectors were likely to have
 been to the change in u1 that presumably resulted from the new UCR.
 The substantive interpretation of the hypothesis is that the magnitude
 of reduction in a senator's net expected utility from objection is
 proportional to his expectations of punishment (1 - q') and/or likelihood
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 of reward (q). The intensity of the debate during the initial UCR and the
 broader legislative setting provide insights into the likely values of the key
 terms. Although the two factions sparred over short-term procedural issue,
 they were natural allies when it came to the long-term substantive issue
 of continued support for American agriculture. Recall that in his
 introductory remarks, Baker alluded to a pending, separate bill on target
 prices. Thus initially objecting senators probably believed that there was
 high probability of punishment if their objections killed the Dairy and
 Tobacco Bill. Theoretically, this suggests a large 1 - q' (probability of
 punishment, given objection) and by necessity a small q'. Similarly, on
 the consent side of the equation senators probably believed that
 cooperation on the Dairy and Tobacco Bill would be rewarded later in
 the session when target prices were to be considered independently.
 Therefore q was probably reasonably large and q' - q was large and
 negative.
 The formal upshot from these impressionistic assessments is that each
 of the likely values-a large positive change in "u, a high q, and a low q'-
 would produce a large negative change in E, thereby making objection
 a much less attractive strategy under the second UCR. Thus the observed
 behavior supports the theory.
 Case 2: Martin Luther King Holiday. HR 3706, a bill to create a national
 holiday in honor of Martin Luther King, Jr., passed with strong support
 (338-90) of members on the House of Representatives on August 2, 1983.
 Senate leaders had hoped to act on HR 3706 on October 3, but their plan
 was aborted when Senator Jesse Helms launched a filibuster just as the
 bill came to the floor under the normal rules. The leadership of both parties
 responded by filing for cloture. The vote on cloture was scheduled for
 October 5, but even if cloture had been successful, the number of pending
 amendments was sufficient to tie up the Senate as it was trying to conclude
 its business before the Columbus Day recess. Given these constraints,
 Howard Baker mounted a last-ditch effort to circumvent the normal rules
 by proposing that the bill be considered under a unanimous consent
 agreement. He was pessimistic when introducing the request. "Mr.
 President, as I indicated last evening, I wish to propound a unanimous
 consent request. I am by no means sure that it will be agreed to and, as
 a matter of fact, I have been advised that it probably will not be agreed
 to. However, I would like to go ahead and propound the request at this
 time."
 The provisions of Baker's initial UCR were:
 * the pending cloture vote would be vitiated
 * the Senate would consider HR 3706 at 10 a.m. on October 18, 1983
 * Senator Helms would be recognized to offer a motion to commit
 the bill to the Judiciary Committee
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 * debate on the bill would be limited to four hours
 * amendments may be offered but debate would be restricted to one
 hour for each amendment"
 * debate on second-degree amendments, appeals, points of order,
 or other motions would be restricted to thirty minutes
 * final passage would occur on or before 2 p.m. on Wednesday,
 October 19 and
 * "that the agreement be in the normal form. "12
 Most of the provisions are self-explanatory and were not controversial.
 The provision setting a time for final passage would preclude a filibuster
 and therefore was potentially objectionable to opponents of the bill. But
 surprisingly, the last provision became more important. Immediately after
 the UCR was proposed, Baker expounded on "the normal form" by stating
 that "no amendments would be in order except amendments that were
 germane to the bill itself." This led Senator Gordon Humphrey (R-NH)
 to reserve the right to object, presumably because he wanted more details
 on the amendments that would be permitted under the UCR. Humphrey's
 claim was that "it is certainly not my wish to delay the final passage of
 the bill. I do, however, object to the provision which, if I understood it
 correctly, sets a time certain for final passage. As one of the opponents
 of the bill, I intend to offer one or two amendments."
 Baker was reluctant to offer a guarantee to Humphrey that his
 amendments could be considered. When the presiding officer asked
 whether Baker wished to modify his request, he responded: "No, Mr.
 President, I do not. The request was negotiated with many Senators over
 a long period of time and is a package. And, honestly, I think if I were
 to modify it to accommodate the wishes of the Senator from New
 Hampshire-which is a perfectly legitimate request . . . it would make
 the agreement unacceptable to a number of Senators because there would
 no longer be any practical limit on the length of time that could be
 consumed in the debate on this measure .... So, without a time certain,
 I am afraid that the arrangement would fall apart."
 In the subsequent debate it became clear that Humphrey did not object
 to the provision of the UCR setting a time for final passage as such, but
 rather merely wanted a reasonable assurance that his amendments would
 be considered. Interestingly, even Senator Helms exhorted Humphrey not
 to object. After a few minutes of formal negotiation, Senator Baker
 suggested the absence of a quorum. During the first quorum call, the
 conferring senators were unable to reach a new agreement, so Senator
 Moynihan requested another quorum call to allow the informal
 1" The specific amendments were not mentioned in the UCR.
 12 Except where quoted, the provisions are paraphrased from the Congressional Record.
 Quotations that follow are all extracted from the Record, October 5, 1983, pp. S 13606-8.
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 negotiations to continue. When a new tentative agreement was reached,
 Baker asked and received unanimous consent that the quorum call be
 rescinded (an example of a simple UCA) and proposed a modified UCR
 that ultimately satisfied Senator Humphrey. There were only three
 changes in the second UCR. Two of them extended the allotted time for
 debate (moving to 9 a.m. the time at which the bill was to be taken up,
 and extending to 4 p.m. the time by which a final vote was to be taken).
 The third change waived paragraph four of rule XII, thereby permitting
 the new UCR to be agreed to in the absence of a quorum (since a few
 Senators were on the floor when the new agreement was negotiated).
 The example illustrates the practice of bending but not breaking the
 norm of consent by reserving the right to object without rejecting outright.
 The case also raises two difficult questions. First, why did Humphrey
 nearly object to the proposed agreement and then withdraw his objection?
 And perhaps more puzzling, why did Helms, who had previously
 filibustered against the King holiday, give his consent to the UCR that
 precluded a filibuster? A closer examination of the case, including
 preceding and subsequent events, provides tentative answers to these
 narrow questions and has broader implications for leadership strategy.
 A reading of the Record makes it clear that Humphrey's strategy of
 threatening to object to the UCR resulted in his right to propose two
 amendments that otherwise would not have been considered. But the fit
 between the facts and the theory is not immediately obvious as Humphrey
 seemed not to expect that his amendments would pass.'3 For example,
 he introduced one amendment by saying, "Mr. President, I am under no
 illusions. A colleague observed to me a moment ago that this bill is
 unamendable, that you could not even amend the pledge of allegiance
 to the bill, and I believe he is probably correct."
 Position-taking provides an explanation for Humphrey's change from
 objection to consent. The congressional literature is rich with examples
 of members benefiting from symbolic behavior independent from policy
 outcomes (Mayhew, 1974). If accordingly a senator's assessment of an
 outcome incorporates both policy and process, then Humphrey's behavior
 can be explained by the theory. The evidence suggests that Humphrey
 accepted x as a foregone conclusion but nevertheless valued greatly an
 agreement that permitted him to offer two amendments during which he
 could make known his position for economical operation of government.'4
 Thus the change can be interpreted as an increase in the u(x) component
 13 Indeed, his amendments were defeated 16-74 and 11-83.
 1 One of his amendments was to change the date of the holiday to the third Sunday in
 January; the other was to move the Lincoln holiday to Sunday instead of having a King
 holiday. When arguing for each amendment, he stressed the money they would save.
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 in fi, where u(x) includes opportunities for position-taking in addition to
 the value associated with the expected bill. Hypothesis 2 suggests that such
 a change should decrease the attractiveness of objection, which is
 consistent with Humphrey's change in behavior from near objection to
 consent.
 On its surface, Helms's consent to the UCR for the Martin Luther King
 holiday seems inconsistent with the theory. He strongly preferred no
 holiday (i) to a holiday (x) and had previously filibustered the bill. Yet
 when the UCR that set a time to vote for final passage was proposed,
 he did not object. The key to understanding Helms's consent is Baker's
 scheduling strategy, the effects of which are consistent with hypotheses
 4 and 5. Two points are revealing. First the UCAs for both the King holiday
 and the Dairy and Tobacco Act were negotiated on October 5. Second,
 Baker's proposed UCR for the King holiday immediately preceded the
 UCR for the Dairy and Tobacco Act. Combined with the crowded
 legislative calendar and approaching Columbus Day recess, this
 sequencing may well have changed Helms's estimates of the probabilities
 of reward for consent (q) and punishment for objection (1-q').
 Specifically, had Helms objected to the UCR for the King holiday, the
 chances of reaching an agreement for the Dairy and Tobacco Act would
 have been less likely. Similarly, had he stopped trying to kill the popular
 King holiday bill (which ultimately passed 78-22), his chances for receiving
 cooperation during the relatively compact schedule were probably
 enhanced. Formally, the change in q was positive and the change in q'
 was negative. By hypotheses 4 and 5, each of these changes should
 diminish the net expected benefit from objection. Of course we cannot
 be sure that had this scheduling not occurred, Helms would have
 continued his efforts to kill the King bill. But the back-to-back
 propoundment of the two UCRs almost surely made deviation from the
 norm of consent a much less desirable strategy.
 IV. IMPLICATIONS
 The general statement of the theoretical result-that senators frequently
 consent to UCRs because it maximizes expected utility-may seem
 vacuous when considered alone. But if the cases examined are typical,
 the theory takes on additional significance in light of the observed
 tendency of the Senate leadership to exploit others' maximization calculi
 to induce cooperation. Several theorists have recently addressed the
 question of how cooperation evolves and persists in Congress-an
 institution that is presumably increasingly "individualized" (Ehrenhalt,
 1982). Although their answers vary, they share the view that bargains are
 rarely struck explicitly, and that even implicit deals are nonbinding.
 Nevertheless, cooperative behavior is sufficiently common that it creates
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 the appearance of a norm in the conventional sense. Ferejohn (1985), for
 example, attributes the instigation and persistence of food stamps and
 agricultural programs to jurisdictionally and preference-induced logrolls.
 Shepsle and Weingast (1985) argue that the reason committees rarely get
 "rolled" on the floor is neither because of the apparent "norm of
 deference" nor because of insufficient temptations for noncommittee
 members to propose amendments, but rather because the committee
 possesses an ex post veto in the conference committee stage. And Axelrod
 (1984) offers interpretations of Congress based on his study of repeated
 play two-person prisoner's dilemma games.
 The theoretical results on unanimous consent agreements are not
 necessarily inconsistent with such explanations. Although UCAs are
 binding, members cannot be forced to enter into them. Nor can they be
 punished formally for reneging on implicit (or for that matter explicit)
 quid pro quos in the form of, say, mutual consent pacts. But the subtler
 empirical insight of this study stems from the existence of endogenous
 institutional features, such as the unanimous consent procedure, and from
 the ability of leaders to manipulate parameters in other senators' decision
 rules. These facts of senatorial life are opportunities, indeed invitations,
 for leaders to construct situations in which potential defectors' extreme
 temptations to object are tempered by the prospect of severe costs, such
 as the loss to Jesse Helms of a prized tobacco bill. In the absence of binding
 agreements, endogenous institutions may be the next best thing when, as
 UCAs, they permit leaders to construct situations in which the socially
 desired behavior is rational by individual cost-benefits standards. In short,
 even Dole's "free spirit" senators often can be induced to "go along."
 A closely related but largely unexplored theme is the stability (or
 instability) of outcomes in settings with endogenous institutional
 arrangements. Some theorists have suggested that if members of an
 institution are permitted to change its rules (as senators do whenever they
 enter into a UCA), then many or most of the chaos theorems (e.g.,
 McKelvey, 1976; Schofield, 1978) pertain also to collective choices of
 institutions, except that perhaps preferences regarding institutions are
 relatively "congealed" (Riker, 1980). But this study suggests an argument
 against the dizzying prospects of endless cycling over the space of
 institutions. UCAs may reasonably be viewed as formal agendas selected
 by but ultimately imposed on senators. The agendas are remarkably
 binding; a UCA can be rescinded only by another UCA. Theoretically,
 then, the only way to cycle over these institutional arrangements would
 be for all senators to change their minds. A necessary condition for chaos
 in institutional choice therefore would be extreme fluidity of preferences.
 Since empirically this is an unlikely prospect, the endogeneity of
 institutions such as UCAs would seem to induce stability, not undermine
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 it. Given that UCAs are reached with increasing frequency (albeit
 sometimes painstakingly), and deferring the difficult question of what
 form UCAs take, a reasonable conjecture is that the existence of structure-
 induced equilibria, a la Shepsle (1979), need not depend upon exogenously
 imposed institutions. Equilibrium outcomes may exist even when the
 "structures" are endogenous and situation-specific. Theoretical
 speculation aside, however, the more reliable point is that institutional
 features such as UCAs are frequently employed cases of institutional
 endogeneity and thus fertile testing grounds for forthcoming theories of
 institutional choice.
 Summarizing more narrowly, this study has employed an explicitly
 individual and strategic perspective on congressional norms and has
 assessed its usefulness for answering the question of when and why
 senators go along with unanimous consent requests. The correspondence
 between the theory and the cases suggests that norm-related strategies
 vary in systematic and potentially predictable ways. At minimum, the
 results underscore the hopeful prospects for continued study of
 congressional behavior using the strategic perspective. To reiterate, norms
 are not merely collective and regular standards of conduct; more
 specifically, they are products of individual and variable strategic
 decisions. Congressmen have reasons for choosing to conform to norms
 and neither more nor less selfish reasons for choosing to deviate.
 APPENDIX
 Proposition. A senator will object to a unanimous consent request on
 issue x if and only if
 u >q-q'
 u -p
 Proof. First note that ii + ui = 1, since by definition i = u, (i) +
 u2(y) and u1 = Ul(X) + U2(^). Adding and rearranging yields
 U + U = [Ul(i) + U2(y)] + [Ul(X) + U2(?)]
 = u(i,y) + u(x,y) (by A5)
 =1 + 0
 = 1.
 The remainder of the proof consists of simple algebraic manipulations and
 occasional use of the fact that i + uj = 1.
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 X4-q' - pq + [(l-q') - p(l-q)]d - (1-p)qu >O (3)
 q'- pq + u - q'u + pqu - pu - qu + pqu >0
 pq(d + u - 1) + q' - q'u - qu + d - pu > 0
 q'- q'u - qul + u - pu > 0
 q'(1 - u) - qul + ii - pu > 0
 q'u - qu + u - pu > 0
 ui (q' - q) + d(l - p) >0
 q--q >0
 '-p ui
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